You check the public artifacts instead of asking us. Verification runs with Pupul's servers out of the loop: published JWKS keys, a public revocation list, and signed ledger checkpoints are all readable by anyone, right now, with nothing more than a browser.
Do not take this page's word for it either. The keys, the revocation list, and the ledger checkpoint are live links. Open them.
A record that only its host can vouch for is a record that is exactly as trustworthy as its host. That is not good enough for a document that claims to be a years-long history of a person. So Pupul is built so that the important questions can be answered without asking Pupul anything at all.
A signed ledger checkpoint proves an entry existed at a point in time without asking Pupul's permission. If we tried to rewrite history later, the checkpoints already in the world would contradict us.
The signing keys are published as standard JWKS at a well-known URL. Anyone can fetch them and check a signature. No account, no API key, no permission.
Every reader checks the public revocation list first, so access dies even for someone still holding a cryptographically valid token. The list is a plain file anyone can read, and Pupul publishes the count of revocations.
Everything below is public. You can run all five checks against a profile share without a Pupul account and without Pupul knowing you did it.
Fetch noctaracorp.com/.well-known/noctara-revocations.json. It is a plain file, readable by anyone. This check comes first on purpose: every reader checks the revocation list before honoring anything else, so a person's decision to pull access wins even against someone still holding a cryptographically valid token. A revoked share is dead no matter what its signature says.
Fetch noctaracorp.com/.well-known/jwks.json. These are standard JSON Web Keys at the standard well-known path, the same format used across the industry. They are what every signature in the system verifies against.
Take the signed share token you were handed and verify its signature with the published keys, using any standard JWT or JWS library. This step completes entirely on your machine. Pupul's servers are out of the loop, which is the point: a forged profile fails here no matter what its contents claim.
Fetch noctaracorp.com/api/v1/log/checkpoint. A signed checkpoint proves an entry existed at a point in time without asking Pupul's permission. Checkpoints already published cannot be quietly replaced later without the replacement contradicting copies in other people's hands. This is what makes "dated the day it was written" a checkable claim instead of a promise.
If you want to see the whole loop close, run the live revoke demo: grant access, revoke it, and watch the revocation land on the public list. Pupul publishes the count of revocations, so the list's activity is itself on the record.
The one-sentence version: a Pupul profile is verifiable because its keys, its revocations, and its ledger checkpoints are public artifacts that anyone can read without Pupul's involvement.
A profile that a person hands to a coach, a firm, or an AI assistant is only useful if the receiver can believe it. Belief that depends on trusting the hosting company does not survive the hosting company having a bad day, changing owners, or simply being wrong. So the design removes us from the trust path: signatures verify against published keys, timestamps verify against signed checkpoints, and authorization verifies against a public list. We host the record. We do not get to be the last word on whether it is real.
This mechanism, the continuity record, is the subject of a provisional patent, US application 64/048,624. The filing covers the mechanism described on this page. It does not change what you can verify: everything above is public whether or not you care about the patent.
Open Pupul, share a profile, then verify it with our servers out of the loop. The keys, the list, and the checkpoints are already public.